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DEPOSIT INSUR.ANCE, MARKET DISCIPLINE AND OFF-BALANCE SIlliET
 
BANKING RISK OF LARGE U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS
 
ABSTR.ACT
 
The "market discipline" of off-balance sheet banking activities (OBSA) has been 
reexamined by employing contingent claims valuation techniques to derive implied 
asset variances from bank equity and deposit insurance, and from risk-premia for 
bank subordinated debt. Specifically implied asset variances have been 
calculated from contingent valuation models and have been regressed over 
on-balance accounting risk variables and off-balance sheet activities. These 
implied asset variances are better than equity variance or risk-premia in 
proxying total risk because they consider both the non-linear nature of 
contingent claims model and the impact of closure rules. Empirical results 
document the existence of "market discipline" of some OBSA. ~rarket participants
price these OBSA as risk-reducing. Therefore, regulatory additional capital 
requirements of such OBS may be inappropriate. 
I. Introduction 
This paper examines "market discipline!' of off- balance sheet activities 
(OBSA) by employing option-pricing models to calculate bank asset risk. OBSA 
have been growing rapidly in recent years. Total OBSA gre~{ from 1.4 billion 
dollars in 1984 to 5.7 billion dollars in 1988. Such OBSA represented 58% of 
total bank assets in 1984 and grew to 176% of total bank assets in 1988 
(Table 1). As the volume of OBSA increased, bank regulators are concerned that 
such OBSA \wuld increase riskiness of banks. The risk- based capital 
requirements of OBSA explicitly assume that Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs) are 
as risky as loans, Commercial Letters of Credit (CLCs) are as risky as municipal 
security investments, and Loan Commitments are as risky as the sale of federal 
funds. 'Iuether or not such assumptions are warranted remains an open question. 
Given the growing role of OBSA and the attendant problem for bank regulators, it 
1S important to analyze empirically the riskiness of OBS1. 
Off-balance sheet banking refers to banking products and practices not 
related to traditional forms of portfolio lending. Such OBSA involve earning 
fee incomes by means of transactions that are not registered on bank's balance 
sheets. As a result of its OBSA. a bank faces three general types of portfolio 
risk: credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due to asset 
and hability mismatches on commitment takedmVlls and interest rate s\{aps, and 
liquidity risk due to the over-extension of obligations. 
Banks are required to report OBSA to the FDIC beginning 1984. Due to data 
availability problems, the literature on off-balance sheet activities and their 
risk has primarily been theoretical. 
A key rationale for OBS banking capital regulation is an assumed 
information asymmetry between bank managers and liability holders. The 
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regulatory presumption IS that such DBS activities are risky and the market 
fails to recognize the risk embodied in such DBS activities. The "market 
discipline" studies of DBS banking risk have addresed the question of whether 
market prices of bank liabilities reflect the risk of DBS activities. If 
"market discipline" exists and off- balance sheet activities are found to be 
risk-sensitive, bank liability holders can distinguish DBS banking risk. The 
assumed information asymmetry rationale for capital regulation of DBS 
activities, therefore, becomes less convincing. 
The standard approach used to determine if market prices of uninsured 
liabilities reflect the risk of DBS activities is to regress the relative costs 
of bank funds against on-balance and off-balance measures of risk. This 
approach is inadequate because uninsured bank liabilities or equities are 
subordinated claims whose costs are not linear or monotonic functions of bank 
risk. jIoreover, this approach fails to account for the fact that banks are 
regulated. The fact that regulators may apply solvency rules in I.ays different 
from investors complicates the valuation of subordinated claims. 
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the impact of "market discipline II 
on DBS risk by modeling closure rules explicitly and using contingent claims 
pricing to compute the implied variance of bank assets. This paper calculates 
bank asset risks two ways and regresses these market-determined asset risks over 
on-balance and off-balance activities. First, this research calculates implied 
bank asset variance given the contingent claims nature of equity and deposit 
insurance (Ronn-Verma, 1986). Second, this paper calculates implied asset 
variance given default-risk premia and subordinated debt optIon pricing model 
(Gorton and Santomero, 1988). Once implied asset variances are calculated~ 
these asset risks I.ill be regressed over on-balance accounting measures of risk 
ln addition to OBSA to examine "market discipline ll of such OBSA. The underlying 
premise of this study is that bank equity-holders and subordinated debt-holders 
are more exposed to OBS risk than deposit-holders. Therefore, their assessment 
of the riskiness of OBS activities is realistically determined. 
II. Previous Research and Importance of this Study 
The empirical evidence of the "market discipline ll of OBS banking activities 
is inconclusive. Lynge and Lee (1987) found that the coefficients of 
independent variables incorporating OBS banking activities are significantly 
negative in a model explaining total risk, but insignificant in a model 
explaining systematic risk. Bre\,:er, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) found that 
SLCs reduce systematic risk but loan commitments and commercial letters of 
credit do not affect systematic risk. Pavel (1987) found that loan sales have 
little impact on bank risk. Avery and Berger (1988) regressed three bank 
performance measures against OBS activities and found that SLCs are associated 
\.;ith poor bank performance but loan commitments are associated \,:ith better bank 
performance. 
Pett..ay (1976, 1976a) investigated the accounting factors affecting the 
risk-premium of a bank's capital notes and found that dividend yield and 
earnings growth rate are significant explanatory variables. Cramer and Rogo\,:ski 
(1985) investigated the relationship bet\.;een deposit costs and bank-specific 
risk measures, but failed to find any significant relationships. Baer and 
Bre\,:er (1985) regressed CD rates over various accounting risk measures and found 
that these rates are positively related to risk measures over the period 
1979-82. Hannan and Han\.;eck (1988) employed survey data on CD rates for five 
different maturities and found that variability of earnings and bank capital are 
significant determinants of CD ~isk-premia. 
Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies (1985) explained CD rates as a function of the 
general level of interest rates and various measures of bank risk including 
standby letters of credit. They found that CD rates rose \~ith increasing 
leverage from increases In SLCs but fell \~ith increases in SLCs as a proportion 
of total risky assets. Since these two factors tend to cancel each other, the 
net effect on bank risk of an increase in bank's SLC exposure is negligible. 
In a paper by Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) a cross-sectioon study of 
subordinated debt pricing was conducted for both 1983 and 1984. Examining the 
spread over the comparable Treasury yields these authors \;ere unable to 
demonstrate the effect of any balance sheet or income statement data on bank 
costs. Recently, Gorton and Santomero (1989) used a contingent pricing model 
and regulatory closure rule to examine the relationship bet\.een bank risk and 
accounting risk factors. They found credit and interest risk variables are 
significant in models In \.hich bank debt is aassumed either homogeneous or 
heterogeneous (junior vs. senior) with one year maturity. They attribute this 
finding to the methodological improvement of their research over previous 
studies. They argue that (i) the nonlinearity of contingent claims pricing may 
not be captured by linear regression; (ii) bank subordinated debt may sometimes 
behave like equity; and (iii) the effects of regulatory closure rules, \;hile 
difficult to capture, are not modeled at all in previous literature. Although 
Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1989) studies do not 
include DBS items as explanatory vaariables, these t\W studies shO\. the 
appropriateness of default-risk premia and implied asset variances methodologies 
in examining the "market discipline" of DBS banking risk. . . 
The empirical literature of OBS banking risk contains a number of 
limitations, which this research seeks to rectify. By measuring DBS banking 
risk ln a more theoretically appealing \,ay, bank regulators and investors can 
gain a better understanding of the size of the risks that are involved and 
policies that might make effective control possible. 
This research reports on two capital market tests of DBS banking risk: the 
impact of DBS activities on the implied asset variances calculated from bank 
equity and deposit insurance and implied asset variances calculated from 
subordinated debt risk-premia. This research improves upon the existing 
empirical literature in the following ways. 
First, this paper contends that equity risk is an inappropriate proxy for 
total risk for regulated banking industry because both stockholders and 
regulatory agencies bear banking risks \,hen such institutions fail. Regulatory 
agencies bear part of DBS risk because bank depositors are protected by de facto 
deposit insurance. Given the contingent claims nature of equity and deposit 
insurance, implied asset variances are calculated. 
Second, the empirical literature, to date, has ignored the impact of DBS 
risk on the dafault-risk premia borne by the subordinated debtholders. This 
study uses contingent claims pricing of subordinated debt to calculate implied 
variance. These procedures are superior to previous studies because these can 
assess directly whether DBS banking risk is correlated \,ith market risk while 
avoiding direct use of the yield spreads \,hich are neither linearly nor 
monotonically related to bank asset risk. Third, this research investigates the 
differential impact of various DBS items on bank risk. 
III. Bank Asset Risk in Option-Pricing Frameworks 
3.1 The Valuation of Bank Asset Risk Under Flat Deposit Insurance Premium 
The first measure of asset risk used in this research is the risk-based 
denosit insurance premium estimated by Ronn and Verma (1986). Ronn and Verma 
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demonstrate that empirical estimation of risk and deposit insurance premium is 
tractable when time-series data on the market1s value of bank1s equity and the 
book value of its debt are available. Market perceptions of the FDIC bailout 
policy are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inplied values of 
assets and their volatilities. 
Ronn and Verma applies Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model to 
calculate a 'fair' per dollar deposit insurance premium that takes into 
consideration the FDIC's bailout policy. Ronn and Verma (1986) start with the 
following notation: 
V = the unobserved post-insurance value of the bank's assets; 
B = face value of total debt liabilities; 
~v = the instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return on the 
value of the bank's assets; 
T = time until next audit of bank's assets; 
5 = dividend per dollar of value of the assets, paid n times per period. 
Under the assumption of a constant variance for the rate of return on the 
bank's assets, Merton's (1977) insurance premium per dollar of deposits, d, is 
given by 
d = N [Y + ~v .;T] - (1- 5)n (V/B) N(Y) (1) 
where 
Y = [in {B/V (1- 5)n} - ~v 2T/2 ] I ~v .;T 
N(·) is the cumulative density of a standard normal random variable; ~v is the 
standard deviation of the rate of return on BRC's assets; T is the time to 
expiration, i.e., the time until the next audit of the BHC.(assumed to be 1); 
V is the value of the BHC's assets adjusted for stock-splits and dividends; B is 
the value of the BHC's debt. 
Two variables in the above equation are not empirically observable: V and 
~v. They can, however, be solved for by representing the equity of a bank 
holding company as a call option on the assets of the firm with the same 
maturity as debt and the striking price equal to the maturity value of the debt 
(Black and Scholes, 1973). 
Ronn and Verma (1986) point out that the FDIC does not liquidate a bank as 
soon as it observes that its net \.;onh is negative. Rather the FDIC tries to 
revive the bank. The FDIC is concerned about containing the disruptive effect 
of an individual bank failure to ensure that it never reaches the magnitude of a 
bank run. These concerns not only have the effect of allowing a bank to operate 
up to a certain point beyond complete erosion of net worth, but also are 
perceived by the market to have such an effect. They assume, hOl.;ever, that some 
hypothetical limit of erosion of value exists such that revival becomes too 
costly. This hypothetical limit can be expressed as a percentage of total debt 
of the bank. This also alters the boundary condition to be applied to the 
equity, construed as a call option. The closure rule is therefore modeled as 
follows: the FDIC liquidates a bank if VT < pB where VT is the terminal value 
of assets at time T and p < =1 is a policy parameter. Given this modified 
closure rule and the standard options-theoretic relationship bet\.;een the 
instantaneous variances of the derivative and underlying assets, the equity of 
the bank holding company can be \.;ritten as: 
E = V N(x) - pBN(x - ~v IT) (2) 
\.;here x = 
[iN (VjpB) 
~v 
+ ~v2 T/2J 
.yT (3) 
E 
~v = uE YN(x) 
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\{here £ is the market pnce of equity and 0"£ is the instantaneous standard 
deviation of the return on E. Here equity is a fully dividend-protected call 
because being the recipient of dividends, equity is in fact dividend-protected. 
Equations (2) and (3) can be solved simultaneously for the tiW unknOi,ns, V 
and O"v' for each observed E and O"E' Ronn and Verma show that a p of .97 yields 
an aggregate deposit premium weighted average of about 1/12 percent, the flat 
rate premium over the data period in this study. 
The maturity of debt (T) is assumed to be one year ln empirical calculation 
of models (2) and (3). The equity value refers to the maturity of debt while 
the deposit insurance refers to periodicity of audit by the insurer. In a 
regulatory environment, the rational investor would link the debt maturity to 
audit periodicity. These ti,O maturities cannot be separated in the context of 
banks because insured deposits account for a large part of the bank1s debt and 
new deposits made with a bank before the expiration of the insurance are 
automatically covered by the insurance. At audit time, if the FDIC decides to 
dissolve the bank, all depositors are paid off. It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that the time until next audit should be the proper value of maturity 
(assumed to be 1) in both equations (2) and (3). 
The implied variance of bank assets captures the riskiness of a bank and is 
the underlying driving variable in this study. Ronn and Verma (1986) pricing 
equations can be extended in the context of OBS banking activities by including 
OBS items into total debt because not all risks assumed by a bank appear on its 
book. The implied variances \{ill be regressed over bank on-balance and 
off-balance sheet activities to test for their risk-taking.potential. 
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3.2 The	 Valuation of Asset Risk Under Default-risk Premia 
The second measure of asset risk used in this study is in the spirit of 
Gorton and Santomero (1989). Asset variances of banks are estimated by 
inverting an option pricing model of default risk-premia of subordinated debt. 
This approach to risk calculation considers the fact that subordinated debt 
sometimes behaves like equity and sometimes behaves like debt. This contingent 
claims pricing model of subordinated debt also considers the nonlinear 
relationship bet"een market measures of risk and on and off-balance measures of 
risk. ~Ioreover, subordinated debt pricing considers the fact that banks are 
regulated. 
The contingent claims valuation model, derived by Black and Scholes (1973), 
was applied by ~[erton (1974) to liability pricing in the case of a single issue 
of nonconvertible debt. In reality, capital structures involve equity and 
multiple issues of callable non-convertible sinking fund coupon debt of 
different maturities and possibly different pricing mechanisms. The contingent 
claims valuation theory is not rich enough to capture many aspects of real 'vorld 
securities. Nonetheless, empirical tests in this research are based upon 
contingent claims pricing of subordinated debt as developed by Yerton (1974). 
If a firm finances itself solely with pure discount debt and equity, then 
Merton (1~74) has shown that the default risk premium on the firm's debt, 
expressed as the spread bet"een the yield on the risky debt (R) and the yield on 
riskless debt (Rf ) of the same maturity is 
R - Rf = IN[(V/B) exp (RfT) N (-d1) + N (d2)]/T (4) 
")
where d1	 = [1N(V/B) + (Rf + ~-/2) T]/~~ 
= - ~~d2 d1 
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where ~-
') 
IS the volatility of the logarithm of assets of bank: R is the yield on 
subordinated debt and debentures; Rf is the yield on Treasuries of the same 
maturity; V is the value of the bank's assets; T is the maturity of subordinated 
debt (assumed to be 1); B is the face value of debt; N(·) is the univariate 
cumulative normal distribution function. Note that the risk premium, R-Rf , is a 
function of leverage (V/B) , time to maturity (T) and asset variance (~2). In 
the case of a homogeneous debt issue, the greater the volatility of the firm's 
assets, the higher the default risk-premium. 
Given the default-risk premium and other necessary information, the above 
')
prIcIng formula for subordinated debt is inverted to find the volatility, ~~, 
implied by that default-risk premium. T\;o volatility measures \Yill be 
calculated. The first volatility measure treats bank debt as homogeneous, 
imposes a one-year maturity and subordinated debt to assets minus insured debt 
as the leverage variable. The second volatility measure also treats bank debt 
as homogeneous, imposes a one-year maturity but uses subordinated debt plus OBS 
debt to assets minus insured debt as the leverage variable. 
Calculations of implied asset variances require the usual assumptions made 
by Black-Scholes. A maintained assumption of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model is that ~2 is constant and normally distributed. The applicability of 
contingent claims model in discrete time has been demonstrated by Gorton and 
Santomero (1989) in their "market discipline" study of bank risk. :\Ioreover, the 
interest rate is assumed to be nonstochastic. Ronn and Verma (1986) show that 
relative contribution of interest rate variance to overall variance appears 
small. 
In addition, the follolYing assumptions are used for calculations of implied 
variances. 
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1. Deposit insurance is fairly priced; 
2. Aggregation of a bank's multiple issues of subordinated debt by 
weighted average of yields and maturities is a good approximation. 
3. Insured bank debt has the same maturity as subordinated debt. 
The assumption that deposit insurance is fairly priced has received 
empirical support from Pennachi (1987). The fact that some banks have multiple 
issues of debt with different maturities necessitates the second assumption. 
The maturity assumption is necessitated by the fact that the banks in the sample 
have widely varying average maturities of their subordinated debt. Core 
deposits are perpetual and the remainder debt has an estimated maturity based on 
turnover measures (Flannery and James, 1984). Although some measure of the 
maturity of insured deposits is acceptable, there is no standard maturity 
measure for subordinated debt. 
An empirical examination of the bank subordinated debt pricing model is 
complicated by the fact that banks are regulated by authorities that have broad 
discretionary powers. The FDIC may keep a troubled bank open or it may 
liquidate the bank and payoff depositors. The FDIC may also use the purchase 
and assumption technique of dealing with a troubled bank. An exogenously given 
closure rule can be adopted about the behavior of regulatory authority. Jlerton 
(1978) assumed that banks are audited each year and banks will be closed if, at 
audit time, its assets to deposit ratio is belo~i one. Ronn and Verma (1986) 
also assume an annual audit ~iith an exogenously given assets-to-deposits ratio 
below which the bank is closed. The maturity of debt, used in this study, is 
effectively one year because banks are audited each year. :At examination time, 
the stockholders have the choice of satisfying the regulatory criteria or 
forfeiting the bank to the regulators. 
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IV. Data and Empirical Results 
4.1 Empirical Model 
The follo,.ing accounting-based risk model is estimated over cross-section 
and time-series data using the generalized least squares (GLS) technique. The 
expected signs of partial derivatives appear on each independent variable. 
+ + + 
~ = f (OBS, LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, paR) (5) 
IYhere 
~ = implied bank asset risk as previously described; 
oBS = seven variables constructed from all oBS banking activities included 
In the RC-L schedule of the FDIC tapes; 
LEV = ratio of total liabilities over total assets; 
DIY = an index of diversification of the bank's loan portfolio; 
ALoSS = ratio of loan loss reserves over total assets; 
AGAP = ratio of net position (total market rate assets minus market rate 
liabilities) to total assets; 
ASIZE = logarithm of assets of banks; 
paR = cash dividends over net income. 
A pooled cross-section and time-series model, instead of simple oLS, was 
employed to perform the econometric analysis for tl;Q reasons. Cross- section or 
time-series data alone (32 cross-sections and 5 time-periods) do not yield 
sufficient degrees of freedom in regression analysis. 
Seven off-balance sheet variables are constructed from the 19 off-balance 
sheet items of the RC-L schedule of bank call and income reports. These 
variables are AoB, ACoMM, APAPT, ASLC, ACLC, AS1fAP and AoBS -and scaled dOlm by 
total assets. Since off-balance sheet items constitute a heterogeneous 
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collection of participations, commitments: and other arrangements: it is 
difficult to represent the influence of these items in any simple I'ay. These 
independent variables attempt to group items with similar characteristics. 
Similar off-balance sheet groupings are also done by Lynge and Lee (1988). 
These variables are reported in Table 2. LEV, DIV, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE and POP 
are proxies for leverage ratio, diversification index, credit risk, interest 
rate risk, operating risk and dividend payout ratio. These on-balance 
accounting risk variables have also been extensively used in studies of bank 
risk literature. Lee and Bre\,er (1986) used similar variables to investigate 
commercial bank financial policies and their impact on market determined 
measures of risk. The authors found leverage: loan-loss: dividend payout, gap 
variables are significantly related to market measures of risk. Jahankhani and 
Lynge (1980) also used similar variables in their bank risk study and found 
similar results. Pettway (1976) investigated accounting factors affecting total 
risk and systematic risk, and found that dividend and earnings are significant 
variables. 
Koppenhaver (1987), Pavel (1988), and Pavel and Philis (1987) used a 
diversification index to examine the diversification potential of SLCs and loan 
sales. The higher the diversification index is: the higher the diversification 
potent ial" is in the loan portfolio, and the 10l,er the risk is. This research 
exploits these previously tested accounting risk-variables in order to examine 
the "market discipline'! of OBSA. All these variables have been deflated by 
total assets in order to eliminate heteroskedasticity problem in statistical 
estimation. 
1-1:
 
4.2	 Calculation of Bank Asset Risk Under Ronn-Yerma Option Pricing 
Methodology 
4.2.1 Data Analysis 
Extensive data on bank off-balance sheet activities (OBS) are available 
beginning in 1984. The initial sample utilized in this study consists of the 
100 largest banks based on asset size which have continuous data over the years 
1984 through 1988. Market values of equity (EQUITY) for each bank or bank 
holding company are collected from COJWUSTAT yearly tapes. Daily bank stock 
returns and market returns are gathered from the CRSP and the NASDAQ daily 
tapes. Data on off-balance sheet items are taken from the FDIC Call and Income 
Reports for the lead bank of the holding company. The sample is restricted to 
those bank holding companies (BRC) whose lead bank accounts for the majority of 
consolidated holding company assets. The accounting risk variables defined ln 
the previous section (LEV, DIY, AGAP, ALOSS, POR and ASIZE) are constructed from 
data collected from the FDIC yearly tapes. Data from the FDIC tapes, the 
COJ~USTAT tapes, the CRSP tapes and the NASDAQ tapes are merged together, and 
this resulted in a final sample of 32 banks and bank holding companies for 1984 
through 1988. The relative size of market risk measures, accounting risk 
measures and OBS variables are shOlm in Table 3. 
4.2.-2 - Calculation of Bank Asset of Risk 
SIGMAl is defined as the standard deviation of asset return and is 
calculated for each BRC for each year 1984 through 1988 using the RONN-VEro[A 
option pricing methodology. A system of tl,O non-linear simultaneous equations 
(equations (4) and (5) in Section 4) are solved for two unknolms, asset value 
(V) and the standard deviation of asset return (SIGJIA1), by a numerical routine 
for each observed yearly EQl1TY and annualized standard deviation of equity 
return (SIG~L~E). A subrout ine, :lEQNF, in the Internat ional J[athemat ical and 
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Statistical Library (I~SL) is used to solve the simultaneous equation system. 
The initial estimates used for the value: Y, I,as the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of debt, while that for ~v was ~E scaled dOl,n by the 
leverage ratio. The cumulative normal distribution function is calculated by 
using a polynomial approximation developed by Cox and Rubinstein (1985). Total 
liabilities, instead of insured debt liabilities, of BHCs are used for B In 
equations (4) and (5). This may be justified for two reasons. First: existing 
FDIC purchase and assumption policies extend, at least for larger banks, 
de facto accounting for such effects by on-balance sheet variables, and hence 
result in an overall reduction of risk. 
SIG~U2 is calculated in the same way as SIGMA1, except that the leverage 
ratio is augmented by DBS debt. The mean value of ISGJIA2 is smaller than that 
of SIGMA1. This can be explained by the call feature of equity value. As the 
face value of debt is augmented by DBS items: the value of equity decreases at 
the closure date. Because the call value is directly related to asset variance, 
a lower asset variance is associated with a decreased call value. 
4.2.3 Analysis of Results 
Table 4 presents estimates of explanatory variables using SIG~L\l as the 
dependent variable. SIG~IA1 is the standard deviation of asset return calculated 
from Ronn-Yerma option pricing methodology. All but one of the estimated 
coefficient of on-balance measures of risk have the expected signs. Leverage, 
diversification, credit risk and size (LEV, DIY, ALOSS and ASIZE) are 
statistically significant at the 17. level. Dividend payout ratio (PDR) is not 
statistically significant. These results again are consistent I.ith previous 
studies. 
16 
The coefficients of four off-balance sheet variables (AOB~ ACO~D[~ APART and 
ASlvAP) have unexpected positive signs but they are not statistically 
significant. The coefficients of two off-balance sheet variables (ASLC and 
lCLC) are significantly negative at the 5% and 17. levels respectively. It 
appears that risk-reducing diversification effects of Standby Letters of Credit 
(ASLC) and Commercial Letters of Credit (ACLC) dominate risk-increasing effects 
when SIGMA1 is used as the market measure of risk. The coefficient of total 
off-balance sheet items (AOBS) is, however, significantly positive at the 5% 
level. Therefore, it appears that total off-balance sheet items (AOBS) variable 
is risk- increasing ,.;ith this particular risk measure. 
Table 5 presents estimates of explanatory variables USlllg SImU2 as the 
dependent variable. SIG~~2 measures standard deviation of asset return from 
Ronn-Verma option pricing model when the leverage variable 1S increased by OilS 
variable. All but tHO coefficients of on-balance measures of risk have their 
expected signs. Leverage (LEV) is significantly positive at the 1% level. Size 
(ASIZE) is significantly negative at the 1% level. Interest rate risk and 
credit risk (AGAP and ALOSS) variables have unexpected negative signs but they 
are not significant. 
All coefficients of off-balance measures of risk have expected negative 
signs and Commercial Letters of Credit (CLC) is significant at the 5% level. 
4.3	 Calculation of Bank Asset Risk Under Gorton-Santomero Subordinated 
Debt Option Pricing Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Analysis 
This research focuses on the 100 largest U.S. banks and.BHCs, as these are 
only ones with publicly traded subordinated debt and debentures. Data on yield 
measures were gathered on all BHC for bank subordinated debt, debentures and 
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capital notes Ivhich I,ere publicly traded in the NYSE, AjlEX, :\ASDAQ Idth quoted 
sale and bid prices from Jloody' s and Standard and Poor I s bond manuals as of year 
ends 1984 through 1988. To make each BRC debt issue as homogeneous as possible, 
all zero coupon issues and floating rate issues were dropped from the sample. 
This produced 171 issues for 50 BRCs in 1984, 137 issues for 49 BRCs in 1985, 
160 issues for 48 BRCs in 1986, 174 issues for 43 BRCs in 1987 and 223 issues 
for 49 banks in 1988. Virtually all of these bonds were issued against the BRCs 
rather than the bank. There was a fair amount of heterogeneity In terms of 
maturity, coupons and issue size. Acquisitions or name changes of banks have 
been conf irmed from Moody I s Bank and Finance j[anual in order to maintain 
continuity in data collection. 
The risk-free rates of Treasury Securities identical in maturity to each 
debt issue Here collected from ~[oody I s Bond Record. Yields of multiple issues 
of a bank's subordinated debts are aggregated to calculate an average yield. 
Risk-premiums were calculated by simply subtracting risk-free rates of identical 
maturity from the yield measure. The risk-premium used in this study is the 
average premium of all outstanding issues for each BRC for each year. The 
on-balance and off-balance measures of risk are constructed as defined earlier, 
from variables available in the FDIC Call and Income Report for the years 1984 
through 1988. The risk-premia of each BRC is matched against on-balance and 
off-balance measures of risk, and this resulted in a final sample of 32 banks 
and BRCs for each year. The relative size of market risk measures, accounting 
measures and OBS variables are ShOH in Table 3. These risk-premia are then used 
as the dependent variables in regression analysis of on-balance and off-balance 
measures of bank risk. 
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4.3.2 Calculation of Bank Asset Risk 
The average risk-premium for each BRC for each year is used as the input ln 
calculating each BRCls asset volatilities. Values of bank assets are market 
values of equity and book values of debt. The pricing formula (equation 1) is 
simply inverted to find asset volatility implied by the risk-premia. A Fortran 
program was written to solve for unknown asset variance in the non-linear 
equation of the subordinated debt pricing model. These implied variances were 
then used as the dependent variable in the regression analysis of on-balance and 
off-balance measures of bank risk. 
Two asset variances were calculated. SIGMA1 treats bank debt as 
homogeneous, imposes a one-year maturity and uses subordinated debt to assets 
less insured debt as the leverage variable. SImrA2 is the same as SImIA1 ~ 
except that the leverage variable is subordinated debt plus OBS debt to assets 
minus insured debt, because not all risks assumed by a bank appear on its 
balance sheet. Results are presented using both measures of risk, and they are 
generally consistent. 
4.3.3 Analysis of Results 
Table 6 reports the results of regression coefficients when the dependent 
variable is the direct risk measure. SIGjIA1 is the implied asset variance 
derived from a subordinated debt option pricing model. Again all of the 
off-balance sheet variables have negative coefficients. Four out of seven 
estimated coefficients are significant at the 17. level (AOB, ASLC~ ASWAP~ AOBS) ~ 
one is significant at the 57. level (APART), one is significant at the 10% level 
(ACOJDI), and the coefficient of ACLC is not significantly ~ifferent from zero. 
These results again support the risk-reducing nature of OBS banking activities. 
The expected positive coefficient for leverage (LEV) and expected negative 
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coefficient for diversification (DIV) along I;ith negative coefficients of OBS 
variables also suggest that risk-reducing diversification impacts of OBS 
activities dominates risk-increasing impact of these activities. 
All coefficients of the on-balance measures of accounting risk variables' 
except one have the expected sign. The coefficients on interest rate risk 
(AGAP) are significantly positive. The coefficients on credit risk (ALOSS) have 
the wrong sign and this is likely due to the multicollinearity between credit 
risk and interest rate risk (ALOSS and AGAP) variables. The coefficients on 
size (ASIZE) are significantly negative. The coefficients on dividend payout 
ratio (POR) are not significantly different from zero. 
Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates of off-balance and on-balance 
measures of bank risk using SIGJU2 as the dependent variable. SIGJIA2 is similar 
to SImrA1 except that the leverage variable \;as augmented by OBS debt In the 
subordinated debt option pricing model. The coefficients of all OBS variables 
except one have negative signs. THo of these coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level (ASLC, ACLC). The coefficients of five OBS variables (AGB, ACO~~I, 
APART, ASVAP, AOBS) are not significantly different from zero. These results 
suggest that at least some of the DBS variables are risk-reducing. All 
estimated coefficients of on-balance measures of risk have the expected signs; 
and all but tIm are statistically significant at the 57. level. 
The regression results for both measures of asset risk (SImLU and SIG~IA2) 
are consistent with the results of Gorton and Santomero (1989) for on-balance 
measures of risk but extends these results to off-balance measures of risk. The 
results are very similar to the risk-premia model and sugge~t that a market 
discipline exists for OBS banking act i 'lit ies, and subordinated debtholders Vlel; 
these OBS activities of large commercial banks as risk-reducing. 
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V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
"Jlarket discipline" studies of OBS banking risk have addressed the question 
of whether market prices of bank equities and liabilities reflect the risk of 
OBS activities. The standard approach to determine \~hether market prices of 
uninsured equity and debt contain individual bank risk-premia is to regress the 
equity variance of yield spread against on-balance and off-balance measures of 
risk. To date these results have been mixed. The uninsured bank equity and 
debt liabilities are subordinated claims \.hich are not linear or monotonic 
functions of bank risk premia. Yoreover, the underlying risk is dependent upon 
the regulatory closure rule. Without recognizing these complications linear 
equity variance and risk-premia regressions may be inadequate in addressing the 
"market discipline" question. 
The "market discipline" of OBS banking activities has been reexamined by 
using contingent claims valuation models to derive explicit pricing formulae 
which incorporates regulatory closure rules for bank subordinated debt 
(Gorton-Santomero, 1989) and bank equity with deposit insurance (Ronn-Verma, 
1986). Specifically, implied variances have been calculated and regressed over 
on-balance and off-balance measures of bank risk. These implied asset variances 
are better than equity variance or risk-premia in proxying total risk because 
they consider both the nonlinear nature of contingent claims model and the 
impact of closure rules. 
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows. 
All seven off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing depending 
on the proxy used for total risk. Four off-balance sheet ~tems (AOBS, ACLC, 
ASLC and ACOJal) are always risk-reducing regardless of the proxy used for total 
risk. 
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Several on-balance measures of accounting risk also show statistically 
significant correlations \;ith market measures of risk. The pooled cross-section 
and time-series analysis of DBS banking risk provides better coefficient 
estimates (increased t-statistics) and increases the statistical significance of 
models (increased F-statistics). 
The existing policy proposal to regulate DBS banking risk by bringing them 
into a risk-based capital requirement can be analyzed in the light of empirical 
findings of this research. The results indicate that off-balance sheet 
act i vit ies ~ in general, reduce total risk. I{hile bank regulators are conce;:oned 
\;ith total risk and the probability of bank failures, the risk- reducing 
potential of DBS activities indicates that additional capital requirement of OBS 
banking activities will penalize large banks. 
There is clear evidence of a "market discipline" of OBS banking risk. 
~Iarl"et participants price these DBS activit ies as risk- reducing. Therefore ~ 
regulatory interferences in the form of additional capital requirement of DBS 
activities are likely to create distortions in the financial intermediation 
market. 
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TABLE 1 
AGGREGATE VOLUME OF OFF- BALANCE- SIIEET COM1fITIJENTS AND CONTINGENCIES 
U. S. COM~{ERCIAL DANKS
 
ANNUAL DATA AS OF DECEMBER, IN DILLIONS OF DOLLJUlS
 
1984 
Commitments to Lend 495.6 
Futures and forward contracts (exclude FX)
Commitments to buy 40 
Commitments to sell 28.3 
'{hen issued securities 
Commitments to buy 4.3 
Commitments to sell 3.5 
Standby contracts &other option contracts 
Obligations to buy under option contracts 2.8 
Obligations to sell under option 
contracts 1.7 
Commitments to buy FX (incl. $US), spot
&forward 584 
Standby LIC and foreign office guarantees
To U.S. addressees 109.8 
To Non-U.S. addressees 34 
(Amount of these items sold to others 
via participations) 15 
Commercial LIC 30 
Participations in acceptances sold to
 
others 8.4
 
Participations in acceptances bought

from others 1.5
 
Securities borrowed 2.7
 
Securities lent 2.2
 
Other significant commitments &
 
contingencies 24.5
 
1985 
542.4 
57.2 
40.5 
4.4 
3.3 
10.7 
5 
735.2 
134.8 
38.2 
18.2 
28.4 
8.4 
0.9 
3.5 
3.1 
57.7 
1986 
570.4 
99.7 
79.6 
9.8 
6.2 
27.8 
11.8 
890.8 
132.1 
35.8 
18.5 
28.4 
5.4 
0.8 
5.4 
4 
70.5 
1987 
611.6 
122.7 
137.6 
2 
2.1 
48.9 
16.4 
1,504.1 
134 ..j 
33.7 
19.6 
30.5 
4.2 
1.5 
5.9 
4.5 
84.3 
1988 
654.9 
174.3 
234.4 
6.8 
6.6 
67.3 
29.4 
1,683.2 
135.6 
:33.2 
19.2 
30.2 
3.9 
0.5 
6.7 
3.9 
128.1 
Table 1, continued 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Memoranda: 
Loans originated & sold during period 
ending this quarter 50.1 75.6 107.7 192.1 280.4 
Loans purchased during period ending 
this quarter nla nla nla 15.7 18.7 
Notational value of all outstanding 
interest rate swaps n/a 186.1 366.6 714.9 928.6 
Mortgages sold, with recourse 
FmIA & FHLJIC residential mortgage loan pools 
DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold 
or swapped n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a nla 
Private residential mortgage loans n/a n/a n/a n/a nla 
DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a n/a nla 
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Farmer ~Iac agricultural mortgage loan pools 
DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total, excluding memoranda items 1,438.4 1,953.6 2.471. 3 3,686.8 4,445.9 
Total assets (on-balance-sheet items) 2,492.5 2,707.6 2,907.5 2,955.2 3,064.2 
Source: Call Reports (DCC, Ogilvie, October 1990). 
Notes: 
1. FX = foreign exchange 
2. LIC = Letter of credit 
3. DIS principal bal. = outstanding principal balance 
Table 2 
OilS Items (Schedule RG- L Off- ilalance Sheet Variables) 
1. Securities borrowed 
2. Securities lent 
3. Commitments to purchase when issued securities 
4. Commitments to sell when issued securities
 
~. Notational value of interest rate swaps
 
6. SLC to U.S. addresses 
7. SLC to non U.S. addresses 
8. SLC participated to others 
9. Commercial letters of credit 
10. Commitments to purchase foreign currencies 
11. Unused loan commitments 
12. Commitments to purchase futures and forward contracts 
13. Commitments to sell futures and forward contracts 
14. Obligation to purchase under option contracts 
15. Obligations to sell under options contract 
16. Participations III acceptances conveyed to others 
17. Participations In acceptances conveyed from others 
18. Other significant commitments or contingencies 
19. Loan sold or participated to others 
The off-balance sheet variables consist of the following items: 
OB = 3+6+7-8-9+10+11 
cmm = 12+13+14+15+18 
PART = 8+16+17+19 
S1iAP = 5 
SLC = 6+7-8 
CLC = 9 
OBS = OB + comr + PART + S1{AP + SLC + CLC 
Table 3
 
Summary Statistics for Accounting Risk Variables,
 
Off-Balance Sheet Variables and Market Measures of Risk Variablesa
 
Standard 
Variable Svmbol Deviation 
Asset Risk CRV) SImlA 1 .00155 .00179 
Asset Risk (RV) SImlA 2 .00065 .00208 
Asset Risk (GS) SImlA 3 1.55564 .35084 
Asset Risk (GS) SImIA 4 .01470 .05095 
Off-balance sheet groups AOB .97779 .94551 
Commitments ACmm .16469 .24067 
Participations APART .09618 .27160 
National Value of Swaps AS\{AP .32129 .52079 
Commercial Letters of Credit ACLC .01523 .01095 
Standby Letters of Credit ASLC .07394 .04687 
Total Off-Balance Items AOBS 1.58013 1.69662 
Financial Leverage LEV .94938 .01317 
Diversification Index DIV 1. 74527 .67445 
Credit Risk ALOSS .01341 .00956 
Interest Rate Risk AGAP .05955 .13878 
Dividend Payout Ratio POR .50910 .74757 
Logarithm of Assets ASIZE 16.65717 .99929 
a For a sample of 32 commercial banks and bank holding companies over 
1984-1988 periods. 
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(2l68)"· 
-~.9S 
(-4.28)"· 
.OOl4 
(1.41)· 
-.10 
h5.S1)"· 
.19 '69.20, "A 
1.48 
(2.63)"· 
--­
-.11 
(-I .H). 
--­ --­ --­ --­ --­
.018 
(.02) 
-.24 
(~I 1.39)'" .00023 (.18) 
-6.89 
(-4.32> ...., 
.0011 
(.15) 
-.Il 
(-~. 88)"· 
.n 1.9.90 "" 
l.U 
(2.50)·" 
- -
-.10 
(-2.10)·· 
-­ - -­ -­
.H 
( .20) 
-.24 
(.. 11.04)'" 
.OOOU 
(.8S) 
-6.90 
(-4.46) ... 
.0018 
(.80) 
-.Il 
(-6.40)"· 
.12 "G.~) .... 
2. 22 
(1.64)" 
-­ -
-­
-1,21 
(-2.66)·" 
-
-­ -­ .8' (,61) -.23 (-·10.91)"· ,0002 (.12) -1.66 (-~.20)·" .002 (.9S) -.10 (-3.48)"· .16 S6.U ... 
4.~1 
(l.94)··· 
-­ - --­
-.6l 
<,-.64) 
-­ -­
.91 
(.80) 
-.24 
(-12.18)'" .pOOl (2.31)"· 
-7. 28 
(-~.~~) .... 
.0028 
(1.24) 
-.14 
(-9.ll)"· 
•80 ·)2.18 .... 
, S .08 
(4.82)'" 
- -­ --­ -­ -
-.12 
(~l.81)·.. 
--­
I.94 -.23 
0.68)" (-12.'8)'" .0004 -3.11 (2.13)". (-2.36)." 
.0028 
(1.21) 
.-.12 
(-l.Sl)'" 
.82 8".22 .. ".. 
3.19 
(2.12)·" 
-­ - -­
- -­ --­
-.0)8 
(-3.18)'" 
,31 
(.H) 
-.23 
(-11.83)"· .0002 (.92) 
-4.7J 
(-2.ll)"· 
.0018 
( .81) 
-.11 
(-4.31)"· 
.15 ,S5.83 ••• 
HOTES: I) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
SICllAl Is Ihl .nnuIIlled ,I.nd.rd d•• hllon or usel relurns 
calculAl.d rro. Gorlon-S.nlomero (l989) subordln.led debl opllon 
pricing ".lhodoiogYi 
AOll. AC~, APART, ASIC, ACIC. ASIJAP Ind AOOS repreunt seven-­
orr-b.hnee s1.e.l varhbhsi 
lEv. DIV, AGAP. AlOSS, POR .nd ASIZE r.presenl (lnlnehl hver­
Ige, dlversUle.llon Ind.. , Inleresl rall risk, eredll risk, 
dIvIdend p.youl Ind log.rllhm 01 .... ls rupeelhelv; 
Humbers tn thl parlnlheses arl l-sl.llsltesi 
SlgnUlcon," h.el: ': 103:; .. a 51;; ... : IX. 
TABLE 7 
Pooled Cross-Secllon Ind TI ... -Serle, R..ull, 
(D.p.nd.nl Var ..ule: SIGMAI) 
t:quHtonl 
110, Coo.unr 
.11 
(1.55)' 
60b 
-.9901 
(-.51) 
.COtIN 
-­
MART 
-­
A£I.C 
-
AqC 
-­
HI/At 
-
!I1JlS 
-
!.EV 
,12 
(1.1) 
DIY 
T.0018 
(-1.51)' 
IHP 
.0001 
(1.82)" 
IIn~~ 
.0091 
(.11) 
f98 
.0000012 
(.0121 
BJZe 
-.oon 
(-1.69)" 
-2 
a 
.16 
'(~ 
4.16 ., 
.11 
0.18)" 
-­ -.OOO~I 
(-.14) 
-­ - - - -­
.15 
0.11) , 
· ... 0041 
(-1.61)" 
.00012 
(2.00)" 
.0034 
( ,011) 
-.0000002 
(-.002) 
-.001 
(-2.01)" 
.19 'S.36 u 
.19 
(I. ll)" 
- -
-.ooon 
(-.21) - -­ - -
.14 
0.26)t 
-.0038 
(-I. 56)' 
.00012 
(1.91)" 
-.00099 
(_.01) 
-.000001 
. (.:.01) 
-.0011 
(~.OO)" 
.18 4.14... 
.10 
(.99) 
-­
-­ -­
-.14 
(-2./6)'" -­ -­
-­ '.'10 
0,01) - OO~lH:49 .0001l (2.05)" 
-.015 
(-,84) 
.00015 
0.1ll 
-.00008 
(-,04) 
.23 '6.62 .. 
.25 
!l.ll)" -­
- -­ -
-.28 
(-2.44)'" 
--­ --­
•ig 
0.62)' 
-.0046 
(-1.19)" .00014 (2.U)"· 
-.Oll 
(-. ))) 
-.00002 
(-,28) 
-.004 
h2,H)'" 
.21 "8.00 ., 
. 21 
(1.11)" 
--­ -­ -­ -­ -­
.no02 
(,10) 
-­
.15 
(1.21) 
-.0049 
(-!.19)" .0001l 
. (2.08) 
.0021 
(,025) 
.0000001 
(,001) 
-.0042 
(-1.14)" 
.23 :6.19~ a, 
.19 
(1.10)" 
- - --­ -­ -­ --­
-.0001 
(-.56) 
.34 
0.11) 
-.0042 
(-1,61)" .00012 (1.92)" 
.019 
(,21) 
.000002 
(,011 ) 
-,0035 
(-1.82)" 
.19 ,4.91 ., 
1I0TES: I) 
2) 
]) 
~~ 
SIGW.4 II Ihl 10nulllud 'lindard d.... llon of .... I rllurn, 
calculaled froll Gorlon-SloloDlero (1989) ",bordlnlled d.bl opllon 
prIcing lIelhodology when Ihl on-uilinci deul h AuglOenlAd by 
oll-ul1&ncl d.bl. 
ADD, ACC»fl, APART. ASl.C, ACLC, ASI/AP And ADOS repr.. lol ..y.o 
o((-bl lanci ,heel Ylrlable,. 
LEV, DIV, },GAP, Al.OSS, POR Ind ASUE repre ..nl flnlnchl le•• r-
Ige, dlyu,lflcilion Ind.. , lnlarul rail rhi, credit rlli, 
dlYld.nd plyoul Ind loyulll". 01 Iss.1i rup.ctly.1Yi 
HURobers In lhl par.nlh.... Ir. 1-lllllIlles; 
Slgnlllclncl 1<Yel: • = 10%; •• = 5%; ••• = U:. 
